Decentralizing Power: Governance & the Active Set (Part 2)
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Staked OSMO holders are eligible to vote on governance proposals. When a user bonds OSMO to a validator to receive staking rewards and in turn obtain voting power. Validators never have ownership of the bonded OSMO. Delegating, bonding, and staking generally refer to the same process.
\n Governance is identified as a critical piece of the Osmosis ecosystem by their team, citing that the rate at which Osmosis will be adding new features will rely on the active participation of the community in passing protocol upgrades. In this spirit, Osmosis is self‐described as being "designed such that the most efficient solution is reachable through the process of experimentation and rapid iteration by leveraging the wisdom of the crowd."
Any OSMO holder can participate directly in Osmosis governance via the Osmosis app or CLI, and any OSMO holder may submit a new governance proposal by submitting a small deposit which functions to prevent spam. Delegators inherit the vote of the validator they are delegated to unless the delegator actively submits a vote themselves, which overrides their inherited vote.()
The voting period is currently a fixed 14-day period. During the voting period, participants may select a vote of either 'Yes', 'No', 'Abstain', or 'NoWithVeto'. Voters may change their vote at any time before the voting period ends.
Based on Cosmos hub, Voting power, whether backing a vote of 'Yes', 'Abstain', 'No', or 'NoWithVeto', counts toward quorum. Quorum is required for the outcome of a governance proposal vote to be considered valid and for deposit contributors to recover their deposit amounts. If the proposal vote does not reach quorum (ie. less than 40% of the network's voting power is participating) within 14 days, any deposit amounts will be burned and the proposal outcome will not be considered to be valid.
In this bounty, we were asked to answer to these questions:
- Analyze the participation of the new validators on the governance proposals after the active set increases.
- Did new validators vote more or less than the original top 66% of validators? Did time play a factor?
- Analyze changes in governance participation t+30,+60,+90 days after these proposals.